We test people's ability to optimize performance across two concurrent tasks. Participants performed a number entry task while controlling a randomly moving cursor with a joystick. Participants received explicit feedback on their performance on these tasks in the form of a single combined score. This payoff function was varied between conditions to change the value of one task relative to the other. We found that participants adapted their strategy for interleaving the two tasks, by varying how long they spent on (...) one task before switching to the other, in order to achieve the near maximum payoff available in each condition. In a second experiment, we show that this behavior is learned quickly and remained stable for as long as the payoff function did not change. The results of this work show that people are adaptive and flexible in how they prioritize and allocate attention in a dual-task setting. However, it also demonstrates some of the limits regarding people's ability to optimize payoff functions. (shrink)

Excerpt from The Various Theories of the Relation of Mind and Brain Reviewed The following short treatise was originally delivered in the form of two lectures to the "Glasgow Psychological Society." It is a work, therefore, more suggestive than exhaustive - its principal aim being to show the insufficiency of any physiological theory to explain the co-relation of mind and brain. This is a subject of vast importance, and ought to be studied calmly, earnestly, and perseveringly, unhampered by any preconceptions. (...) I need scarcely add that the subject is as difficult as it is vast - is even mysterious at every step - and has puzzled the greatest minds in all ages; yet let us hope that it is not insolvable, but that erelong we shall be able to explain in a satisfactory manner the various phases of mental phenomena, and their material correlate, if such relation there is. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

According to Lewis's modal realism, all ways the world could be are represented by possible worlds, and all possible worlds represent some way the world could be. That there are just the right possible worlds to represent all and only the ways the world could be is to be guaranteed by the principle of recombination. Lewis sketches the principle (put roughly: anything can co-exist with anything else), but does not spell out a precise version that generates just the right possibilities. (...) David Efird and Tom Stoneham have offered a principle that aims to do just that.In this paper, we argue that Efird's and Stoneham's principle of recombination is not successful – it fails to generate the right possibilities – but we also suggest ways that their account might be improved to solve the problem we raise. We also argue against Efird's and Stoneham's claim that the correct principle of recombination demonstrates the possibility of nothing concrete – it is true that their principle of recombination has models consistent with the existence of an empty world, but we only get the possibility of nothing if mereologically null individuals are possible. The Lewisian should only think mereologically null individuals are possible if he or she has some independent reason for believing in the possibility of an empty world, so the principle of recombination provides no new evidence for that possibility. We draw some morals from this for the correct way to formulate the principle of recombination. (shrink)

In a recent Opinion article, Sui and Humphreys [1] argue that experimental findings suggest self is ‘special’, in that self-reference serves a binding function within human cognitive economy. Contrasting their view with other functionalist positions, chiefly Dennett's [2], they deny that self is a convenient fiction and adduce findings to show that a ‘core self representation’ serves as an ‘integrative glue’ helping to bind distinct types of information as well as distinct stages of psycho- logical processing. In other words, where (...) Dennett regards self as analogous to a center of gravity, a simplification posited by observers, Sui and Humphreys regard self as a function that modulates mental processes. In practice, however, the concept of ‘self’ they employ is not unlike Dennett's. We side with Sui and Humphreys in hold- ing that self-reference modulates mental processes: reference to self during a task can bind memory to source, increase perceptual integration, and link attention to decision making, among other things. What is more, these functions are not reducible to other factors such as semantic coding, familiarity, or reward [3]. But whereas Sui and Humphreys contribute important empirical detail, the binding functions they describe are compatible with Dennett's version of functionalism, which treats self as an artifact of social process. (shrink)

This article advances towards the reconceptualization of financial innovation. It examines the calamitous role of financial innovation in the global financial crisis, developing a non-rational theorization of finance within the social economy that factors in the role of affect. Outlining the foundations for such an approach, the analysis draws on Thorstein Veblen and Georges Bataille, whose work encompasses psycho-social conceptions of political-economic agency. From the more anthropological lens of Veblen and Bataille's theorizations, it is possible to move beyond instrumentalist accounts (...) of financial innovation premised on pecuniary expedients and aspirations of market completion. As we argue, in a broader affective economy, contemporary financial innovation serves invidious ends, providing a means of attaining social distinction, constituting a medium for violent expenditure and bestowing access to sovereign expression on its purveyors. Highlighting the non-rational dimension of financial markets prompts a reconsideration of the nature of crisis and the means of its redress. (shrink)

Pursuing Justice in Africa focuses on the many actors pursuing many visions of justice across the African continent--their aspirations, divergent practices, and articulations of international and vernacular idioms of justice. The essays selected by editors Jessica Johnson and George H. Karekwaivanane engage with topics at the cutting edge of contemporary scholarship across a wide range of disciplines. These include activism, land tenure, international legal institutions, and post-conflict reconciliation. Building on recent work in sociolegal studies that foregrounds justice over and (...) above concepts such as human rights and legal pluralism, the contributors grapple with alternative approaches to the concept of justice and its relationships with law, morality, and rights. While the chapters are grounded in local experiences, they also attend to the ways in which national and international actors and processes influence, for better or worse, local experiences and understandings of justice. The result is a timely and original addition to scholarship on a topic of major scholarly and pragmatic interest. Contributors: Felicitas Becker, Jonathon L. Earle, Patrick Hoenig, Stacey Hynd, Fred Nyongesa Ikanda, Ngeyi Ruth Kanyongolo, Anna Macdonald, Bernadette Malunga, Alan Msosa, Benson A. Mulemi, Holly Porter, Duncan Scott, Olaf Zenker. (shrink)

Buddha and Christ: Images of Wholeness. Robert Elinor. Lutterworth, Cambridge 2000. 233 pp. £40.00. ISBN 0 7188 3011 3. Jesus and Buddha: The Parallel Sayings. Edited by Marcus Borg. Duncan Baird, London 2002. 160 pp. £16.99. ISBN 1 903296 79 X.

ABSTRACTThis paper provides a detailed account of the period of the complex history of British algebra and geometry between the publication of George Peacock's Treatise on Algebra in 1830 and William Rowan Hamilton's paper on quaternions of 1843. During these years, Duncan Farquharson Gregory and William Walton published several contributions on ‘algebraical geometry’ and ‘geometrical algebra’ in the Cambridge Mathematical Journal. These contributions enabled them not only to generalize Peacock's symbolical algebra on the basis of geometrical considerations, but (...) also to initiate the attempts to question the status of Euclidean space as the arbiter of valid geometrical interpretations. At the same time, Gregory and Walton were bound by the limits of symbolical algebra that they themselves made explicit; their work was not and could not be the ‘abstract algebra’ and ‘abstract geometry’ of figures such as Hamilton and Cayley. The central argument of the paper is that an understanding of the contributions to ‘algebraical geometry’ and ‘geometrical algebra’ of the second generation of ‘scientific’ symbolical algebraists is essential for a satisfactory explanation of the radical transition from symbolical to abstract algebra that took place in British mathematics in the 1830s–1840s. (shrink)

This paper explores two important ways in which the practice of close reading differs from the technique of natural language processing, the use of computer programming to decode, process, and replicate messages within a human language. It does so in order to highlight distinctive features of close reading that are not replicated by natural language processing. The first point of distinction concerns the nature of the meaning generated in each case. While natural language processing proceeds on the principle that a (...) text’s meaning can be deciphered by applying the rules governing the language in which the text is written, close reading is premised on the idea that this meaning lies in the interplay that the text prompts within readers. While the semantic theory of meaning upon which natural language processing programs are based is often taken for granted today, I draw from phenomenological and hermeneutic theories, particularly Wolfgang Iser and Hans-Georg Gadamer, to explain why a different theory of meaning is necessary for understanding the meaning generated by close reading. Second, while natural language processing programs are considered successful when they generate what epistemologists call true beliefs about a text, I argue that close reading aims first and foremost at the development, not of true belief, but of understanding. To develop this distinction, I draw from recent scholarship on the epistemology of education, including work by Duncan Pritchard, to explain how understanding differs from true belief and why attainment of the latter is less educationally significant than the former. (shrink)

This book addresses two main topics—first, the morality of thought and, second, what’s involved in having a free mind. It connects these topics by arguing that to have a free mind, a person must be willing to follow his thoughts wherever they lead, and that this just isn’t possible if the person thinks that some thoughts are morally off limits. The book therefore defends the unpopular position that it is not morally wrong to have even the nastiest of attitudes, the (...) most biased of beliefs, or the vilest of fantasies. Even when some of what we think is ugly, there is beauty and value in our being able to think it. -/- . (shrink)

Socrates argued that the unexamined life is not worth living. What this means is we are so ignorant that we are guilty of criminal negligence how to lead our lives, unless we do our due diligence by philosophising.

Using American football as a point of entry, I approach harmful sports from the perspective of fans’ roles and responsibilities. Given that sports’ profitability is a significant obstacle to reform...

Many systems of logic diagrams have been offered both historically and more recently. Each of them has clear limitations. An original alternative system is offered here. It is simpler, more natural, and more expressively and inferentially powerful. It can be used to analyze not only syllogisms but arguments involving relational terms and unanalyzed statement terms.

The philosopher and critic George Henry Lewes published this work in two volumes in 1845–6. This is a reissue of an 1892 printing, which brought the volumes into one book. Lewes wrote widely on literature, science and philosophy, and was also the long-term intimate companion of George Eliot. This book is a narrative history, rather than an encyclopedia, of key philosophers. It is, therefore, a partial and personal study instead of an exhaustive textbook. The first volume concentrates solely (...) on Greek philosophy, beginning with the Pre-Socratics and ending with the Neo-Platonists. The second volume jumps to Francis Bacon, concentrating on British, German and French philosophy, and addressing, among others, Spinoza, Locke, Hume and Kant, and ending with Auguste Comte. Containing both historical anecdotes and pithy analyses of ideas, this book reflects the expertise and intellectual sympathies of a Victorian polymath. (shrink)

This article discusses the approach of the Clinical Ethics Consultation Advisory Committee (CECA) in developing A Case-Based Study Guide for Addressing Patient-Centered Ethical Issues in Health Care. This article addresses the processes used by the CECA, its use of pivot questions intended to encourage critical reflection, and the target audience of this work. It first considers the salience of case studies in general education and their relevance for training ethics consultants. Second, it discusses the enfolding approach used in presenting the (...) case material designed to engage the trainee in the details of the case while stimulating critical reflection. And, third, this article briefly comments on the target audience with the caveat that even superbly developed cases are prone to misuse, although that prospect should not deter their development. (shrink)

The paper argues that the question of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms has been largely misconceived. Referencing comparable devices such as anonymity, noms de plume, and heteronyms, and drawing on Heidegger’s discussion of Kierkegaardian pseudonymity in the lectures on Parmenides, the paper further distinguishes between fictional characters (e. g. the Seducer and Assessor Vilhelm), noms de plume (H.H.), fictional editors, and pseudonyms proper. It is argued that in the first authorship only Constantin Constantius and Johannes Climacus approximate to the criteria Kierkegaard himself lays (...) down for pseudonymity. Furthermore, Kierkegaard’s anxieties regarding the form of publication of his works in the late 1840s reveals the whole project of pseudonymity collapsing into incoherence. By means of a comparison with Nietzsche, it is argued that Kierkegaard’s work is less a manifold of different literary personalities and more a play of revealing/concealing voices. In these voices there is nevertheless a literary watermark that makes Kierkegaard’s work as a whole distinctively Kierkegaardian. (shrink)